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Чаба Варга. Різні ментальності романоQгерманського та англоQ
американського права? До питання логіки в праві
У розмові «правило» і «норма» здебільшого вживаються як синоніми.
Насправді вони можуть вказувати на одне й те саме, але з різних точок зору:
«правило» вказує на те, що наявний нормативний припис, а «норма» — на
логічно осмислене концептуальне втілення такого припису. Тому що норми
передбачають аксіоматичний ідеал концептуалізації та логізації права, вони
присутні лише у романогерманських правових системах, де вони формують
догматику права (навпаки, у англоамериканському праві присутні здебільшого
казуальні зразки). Норма є, звичайно, логічно завершеною, а правило —
пропозицією. Відповідно, реконструкція може також виявити, що насправді
жодна з норм чи декілька норм виражаються певним правилом. 
Ключові слова: правило, норма, концептуалізація, логізація, догматика права
Rule / Norm. From the wide range of linguistic expressions and other objectifi-
cations used in the direction of behaviour1, the dilemma of rule and/or norm is not
a scholarly issue in a direct sense. It can be derived neither from the historical ety-
mology of the relevant words nor from investigations into the history of ideas that
inspire or merely match one or another language use. Clear-cut distinctions of
meaning regarding these two terms are not specified either according to various his-
torical periods or the historical cultures of law and legal thought, which have devel-
oped diversely so far. Although their regular usages may be different when com-
pared to each other, in most attempts at a theoretical definition they are still deci-
sively referred to as synonyms2, that is, as concepts able to substitute nearly com-
pletely for one other3. Therefore, which usage is preferred by which language and
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1 Kazimierz Opalek Theorie der Direktiven und der Normen (Wien & New York: Springer 1986) 178 pp.
[Forschungen aus Staat und Recht 70] lists on p. 88 norm, rule and principle, alongside persuasion, wish,
proposal, request, supplication, advice, warning, recommendation, and encouragement, as directions of
behaviour. In such a broad sense, see Mihály Szotáczky ‘A normák eredete és funkciója’ (Genese und
Funktion der Normen) in Tanulmányok Szamel Lajos tiszteletére ed. Antal Ádám (Pécs 1989), pp. 227–238
[Studia Iuridica auctoritate Universitatis Pécs publicata 118].
2 “The rule is a synonym for «norm» or «directive» taken as the declaration of a prescriptive function”.
J[erzy] W[róblewski] ‘Règle’ in Dictionnaire encyclopédique de Théorie et de Sociologie juridique dir.
André-Jean Arnaud (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1988), p. 346. An even simpler
solution is proposed by The Philosophy of Law An Encyclopedia, I–II, ed. Christopher Berry Gray (New
York & London: Garland Publishing 1999) [Garland Reference Library of the Humanities 1743], with the
entry ‘Rule’ referred to but speaking about nothing but ‘Norms’ eventually.
3 This is illustrated by the way how in case even of an otherwise minutely precise author—e.g., Marijan
Pavcnik ‘Pravno pravilo’ Zbornik znanstvenih razprav [Ljubljana] (1995), No. 55, pp. 217–240 and ‘Die
Rechtsnorm’ Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 83 (1997) 4, pp. 463–482 —, one term is simply
replaced by the other when changing between languages.
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culture depends for the most part on mere habits of parlance. However, these habits
may then—through the latent creative (socially constructive) force of the more or
less consolidating use of language—become organised into certain blocks, and
these blocks may from then on, in their own manners and ways, generate addition-
al meanings with specifications according to context that may, for their own part,
also eventually lead to a separation providing some basis for added theoretisation.
Origins and Contexture. The term ‘rule’ [‘règle’, ‘regel’, ‘regola’, ‘regla’] orig-
inates from the Latin ‘regula’, while ‘norm’ stems from Latin ‘norma’ as used to
denote a tool applied by masons and carpenters in ancient Rome to draw a straight
line. In its present sense, ‘norm’—as mostly seen in its derivatives ‘normal, ‘nor-
mality’, etc.—is a product of 19th-century development, differentiating and
homogenising human conditions, social processes and attitudes of production by
adjusting them to previously set standards. To denote ‘standard’, the term ‘norm’ was
first used in pedagogy and then in health care, and later on, during the same century,
it was also extended to standardisation in production and technology, isolating,
defining, combining and re-organising industrial processes as a series of patterns1.
Let us mention, as an illustrative example of incidentalities in the history of the
use of words, that in its original meaning, ‘rule’ once served to express some basic
wisdom or adage, summarising the versatility of Roman jurists indefatigably
searching for the principles of a justifiably right solution —instead of the causal
succession meant by the expression of “if […], then […]”, implying conditional
repetition firstly describing and, then, partly prescribing those facts which may in
their conceptual generality constitute a case and, partly, also ascribing a sanction to
them2.
According to its philosophical definition, a rule is a “formula indicating or pre-
scribing what is to be done in a certain situation”, noting that its prescriptive use
affords a criterion with selective force, and that no such use shall be overshadowed
by those recently spreading constative uses that are—mostly as connected with the
senses of ‘regular/irregular’ or ‘regularity’, etc.—worded as if they were merely
descriptive3.
On the other hand, a norm is the “concrete type or abstract formula of what has
to be done, at the same time including a value judgement in the form of some kind
of ideal or rule, aim or model”; we should note that norms are mostly formulated to
express some logical thought or act of will, free representation or emotion, or ideal
of beauty4.
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1 Cf., e.g., Georges Foucault Surveiller et punir Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard 1975) 318 pp.
[Bibliothèque des histoires], p. 186 and Georges Canguilhem Le normal et le pathologique 4e éd. (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France 1979) 224 pp. [Quadrige], p. 175.
2 For more details, see, by the present author, A jogi gondolkodás paradigmái 2nd ed. [of Lectures on the
Paradigm of Legal Thinking, 1996] (Budapest: Akadémai Kiadó 2004) 504 pp. on pp. 33–34.
3 André Lalande Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie [1926] (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France 1991), pp. 906–907. According to Ota Weinberger’s similar formulation—‘The Role of Rules’ Ratio
Juris 1 (December 1988) 3, pp. 224–240, especially para. 1, p. 225 et seq., “Rules are advice to be used in
determining action.”
4 M[ichel] T[roper] & D[anièle] L[ochak] ‘Norme’ in Dictionnaire encyclopédique… [note 2], p. 691.
While norm is a “synonym of »rule«” (with the latter regarded as somewhat
“more general”1 or “more wide and generic”2), it is remarkable that in everyday
usage a rule is still primarily an explicit or posited formulation as the in-itself neu-
tral and historically accidental outcome of some ‘rule-enactment’ or ‘regulation’,
while a norm is either the logical (logified) form of the above or the logical (nor-
mative) prerequisite of an act of regulation itself.
This explains why ‘rules’ may either be from experience3 or govern a game, e.g.,
of the law [Spielregeln & Rechtsregeln]. All of this is unproblematic in so far as we
are interested in them as the manifestation of, or access to, something. As to its
apparent pair, ‘norms’ enter the scene when the rule’s intended or probable notation
becomes problematic and requires further investigation in a way that, proceeding
from the rule as the presentation of something made accessible to us, we start search-
ing for an identifiable message by means of the former’s logical (etc.) analysis.
It is surely not by mere chance that we can hardly speak of ‘creation of norms’;
and we only speak of ‘provision of norms’ when we intend to emphasise either the
field as being “normed” (ordained under regulation) or the artificiality of that regu-
lation. Notwithstanding, present-day literature suggests as a logical proposition the
idea that a norm can be separated out of a rule by its mere linguistic formulation.
Actually, however, it is not the rule but the norm that is considered, as well as treat-
ed, in an onto-epistemological (and psychological and logical, etc.) perspective in
order to be able to interpret it both as an enunciation and as the contents of denota-
tion (inherent, among others, in a psychologically examinable act of will)4.
The above seems to be substantiated by the fact that while in the English lan-
guage, for instance, historical dictionaries specify more than twenty entries of
meaning and fields of application for the single word ‘rule’, each of these is still
related exclusively to the availability or prevalence of a given measure of behav-
iour, either indicating or merely carrying and/or enforcing it, without any of them
claiming even incidentally that the rule itself can serve as the denotatum (with the
objectification itself or its communication embodying this very measure either
through its textuality and grammatical make-up or owing to the logical interrela-
tionship among its elements)5. Moreover, the pervasive strength of the English lan-
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1 E.g., J.-F. Perrin ‘Règle’ in Archives de Philosophie du Droit 35: Vocabulaire fondamental du droit (Paris:
Sirey 1990), pp. 245–255.
2 Patricia Borsellino ‘Norms’ in The Philosophy of Law An Encyclopedia, pp. 596–598, especially on p. 596.
3 Ibid.
4 For the former, see, above all, Carlos E. Alchourrón & Eugenio Bulygin Normative Systems (Wien & New
York: Springer 1971) xviii + 208 pp. [Library of Exact Philosophy 5], and, for the latter, Hans Kelsen
Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (Wien: Manz 1979) xii + 362 pp., passim, especially paras. 1–10, and
explicitly para. 1, passage III.
5 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary Complete Text Reproduced Micrographically, I–II
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971), pp. 2599–2600. In incidences far away in the past, such examples
may affirm this: “Þeos riwle” [Ancren Riwle a (1225) {2 (Camden Soc. 1853)}] or “Þe pope […] forsook
Þe rule of Þe olde tyme” [John de Bartholomeus (de Glanvilla) Trevisa Polychronicon Randulphi Higden (tr.
1387), VII, 431 {Rolls series 1865–1867}] (original edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, p. 881, column
3 and p. 882, column 1, respectively). Against the historically established use, it is exclusively the modern (and,
in a linguistic sense, rarer) professional usage that can attribute the word such a meaning: “Either according to
the rules of the common law, or by the operation of the Statute of Uses.” Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (1842), XIX, 379/2 (Oxford English Dictionary, p. 882, column 2).
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guage mentality is shown by the fact that not even the amazingly late and slow
spread of the word ‘norm’ provoked any change. That is, in English, until linguis-
tic analysis grew into the main trend of moral philosophising in the first decade of
the 20th century, the word ‘norm’ had exclusively been used to refer to some stan-
dard, pattern or measure made available, and by no means in order to imply that the
standard, pattern or measure itself could have been embodied (objectified) by it in
such a way that one, and exclusively one, single correct meaning could be extract-
ed from such an embodiment1.
In language use, we do not to talk about ‘logic of rules’ instead of ‘logic of
norms’. In no way in everyday practice do we equate the two terms with each other.
Only a ‘logic of norms’ can be thought of, while accepting in advance that nothing
but linguistic propositions conceived of (or prepared so as to serve) as logical units
can be subjected to either a logical operation or any genuine linguistico-logical
analysis.
With Varied Denotations. All this may lead us to the conclusion that in actual
practice and according to a nominal definition, ‘rule’ and ‘norm’ denote the same
thing, the former being considered from the point of view of making it accessible
(communicable) as a message and the latter from that of logic, of internal coherence
and consequentiality of contents. Yet regarding either their genus proximum or dif-
ferentia specifica, we have to realise that both their conceptual volume and their
extension will be different. For no norm can be found in a rule, although the men-
tal reconstruction of its message may generate one. Or a rule may refer to a norm
by forecasting the chance that a norm can be reconstru(ct)ed through—and as medi-
ated by—it. For in itself, rule is but a specific linguistic expression, while in logic
the norm states an abstract logical relation. They have in common the fact that nei-
ther of them can stand by itself. A rule may come to being if thematised (expressed,
declared, posited, etc.) as such, and a norm, if a logical form is given as a result of
mental operations in an intellectual (re)construction. Notwithstanding all this, they
are not related as to form and content to one another. Moreover, they are not co-
extensive. After all, rules differing by language, culture, structure and expression
(etc.) may be logified as expressing the same norm and the same rule (in case of
intentional or unintentional ambiguity, or because of the omission of punctuation or
misprinting, etc.) may serve to reconstruct differing norms.
Norms Exclusively in Civil Law Rechtsdogmatik. In terms of what has been
said above, it is the norm that has become the cornerstone of theoretical system-
construction in our continentally rooted Civil Law, based upon the axiomatic incli-
nation to logification. It is by no mere chance that the construction of Kelsen’s Pure
Theory of Law is founded on the Grundnorm, as it builds the derivation of validity
throughout the entire prevailing law and order on either direct logical or indirect lin-
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1 It is to be noted that, from 1676 on, the word appeared in the form of ‘norma/normae’, always italicised as
a borrowance from the Latin, and started to spread as ‘norm’ only from 1885, albeit between 1821 and 1877
mostly in pairs of synonyms such as, e.g., ‘norm or model’, ‘norm and measure’ or ‘norm or principle’. Ibid.,
p. 1942 (p. 207, column 3).
guistic (conceptual) inference [Ableitung]. Accordingly, the norm is conceived as a
logical unit that has been generated through logical reconstruction and can be sub-
ject to further logical operations. Therefore, it is by no means chance either that
both the need for and the conceptual performance of a doctrinal study of the law—
with the call for a meta-system strictly conceptualised and rigidly logified upon the
law (taken as a thoroughly consistent body of text as concluded from its ele-
ments1)—were formed in the Civil Law2. (It is to be noted, too, that a theory of
norms serving as a Rechtsdogmatik can be erected with no concept of rule implied3
and a theory of rules dedicated to the law’s phenomenal form can also be built up
on the exclusive basis of norm-concepts4).
On the other hand, the Common Law culture—which, instead of striving either
for an exhaustive conceptual representation and textual embodiment (objectification)
of the law or to re-establish it according to axiomatic ideals, and also instead of
reducing security in law to logical deducibility from previously set propositions,
rather focusses on social directness, the rectifying medium of everyday experience
and feedback drawn from dilemmas of decision on the level of common sense as
organically rooted in tradition, as well as the force of social continuity able to pro-
vide a framework for both preservation and renewal in the law—does speak in terms
of rules as an exemplification of the law, that is, as an accidental manifestation and
incidental actualisation in situations when one has to declare what the law is5.
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1 Cf., by the author, ‘The Quest for Formalism in Law: Ideals of Systemicity and Axiomatisability between
Utopianism and Heuristic Assertion’ Acta Juridica Hungarica 50 (2009) 1, pp. 1–30 {&
<http://www.akademiai.com/content/k7264206g254078j/>} {an abridged version as ‘Heuristic Value of the
Axiomatic Model in Law’ in Auf dem Weg zur Idee der Gerechtigkeit Gedenkschrift für Ilmar Tammelo,
hrsg. mit Raimund Jakob, Lothar Philipps, Erich Schweighofer & Csaba Varga (Münster, etc.: Lit Verlag
2009), pp. 119–126 [Austria: Forschung und Wissenschaft – Rechtswissenschaft 3] }.
2 The predominance of the analytical method in applied legal philosophy and the thoroughly constitution-
alised doctrine of the law in recent decades may suggest a greatly changed trend today. However, the pref-
erence for analysis comes from an external interest and the elitist free thinking development of constitu-
tionalism achieved by the US Supreme Court with academic assistance (i.e., by non-elected fora) has not yet
exceeded the impact once exerted by the German doctrine on English legal thought during the second half
of the 19th century, which may have enriched the Common Law in both theoretical interpretability and con-
ceptualisation without, however, disassociating it from its own traditions.
3 Kelsen supplies an illustrative example by avoiding the use of ‘rule’ (except as an element of the term ‘rule
of law’ with ‘rule’ meaning just domination or control) in his final theory of norms [note 11].
4 See below, note 20.
5 This is well illustrated by literature which, historically drawing from the classical heritage of Jewish and
Roman Law to span up to the Anglo–American approach, uses exclusively the term of ‘rule’ as a phenom-
enal designation. Cf., e.g., Derek van der Merwe ‘Regulae iuris and the Axiomatisation of the Law in the
Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries’ Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987) 3, pp. 286–302;
Georges Kalinowski ‘L’interprétation du droit: ses règles juridiques et logiques’Archives de Philosophie du
Droit 30: La jurisprudence (Paris: Sirey 1985), pp. 171–180; Michael Clanchy ‘A Medieval Realist:
Interpreting the Rules at Barnwell Priory, Cambridge’ in Perspectives in Jurisprudence ed. Elspeth Attwooll
(Glasgow: University of Glasgow Press 1977), pp. 176–194; I. D. Campbell ‘Are the Rules of Precedent
Rules of Law?’ Victoria University College Law Review 4 (1956) 1, pp. 7–27; Metthew Jackson ‘Austin
and Hart on Rules’ Edinburgh Philosophy Journal (March 1985), pp. 24–26; Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale
L. Rosenberg ‘Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to Read Cases: Of Specificity, Retroactivity and
New Rules’ The American Journal of Comparative Law 42 (1994) 3, pp. 581–598; Cathy A. Frierson ‘»I
Must Always Answer to the Law…« Rules and Responses in the Reformed Volost Court’ The Slavonic and
East European Review 75 (April 1997) 2, pp. 308–334. In contrast, even in hypothetical situations when 
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Yet, if a rule is unconceptualised (without ever being conceptually related,
analysed and/or classified), that is, if neither logical conceptualisation nor any sys-
temic idea stands behind the practical act of denomination1, then it is to be doubted
whether a Rechtsdogmatik can ever be erected upon such a scheme. For no doctrine
can be built without norms2.
If and in so far as the norm is a logical unit, the rule is a kind of proposition. As
to their environment, norms may stand both on their own and in a systemic context.
On the other hand, rules do presuppose principles, standards and policies that can,
without being rules themselves, demarcate the sphere of the rules’ relevance or
applicability3.
It is for the “scientific” methodology of the doctrinal study of the law to answer
how and to which depth the unlimited (and in principle also illimitable) demand for
logical correlation, consequence and coherence may (if at all) be complemented
with axiologically founded teleological considerations. Therefore, the introduction
of either broader (socially sensitive) definitions (in confronting, e.g., free law to
exegesis) or brand new aspects (in, e.g., teleological interpretation) in an estab-
lished discourse in the Civil Law may equally induce debates shattering norma-
tivism’s basic claim. By contrast, the ascientific approach to law in the Common
Law may openly admit that law can only cover the field of practical reason in which
sober everyday considerations are used to being given preference.
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some normative staff is expressed in a logifying context, one can mostly encounter a norm-concept. Cf., e.g.,
Wolfgang Fikentscher Methoden des Rechts IV: Dogmatischer Teil (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1977), ch. 31,
para. VIII: ‘Die Fallnorm’ and, in a particularly telling context, Wilfried Hassemer ‘Über nicht-juristische
Normen im Recht’ Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (1984) 1, pp. 84–105.
1 Cf., by the present author, ‘La Codification à l’aube du troisième millénaire’ in Mélanges Paul Amselek
org. Gérard Cohen-Jonathan, Yves Gaudemet, Robert Hertzog, Patrick Wachsmann & Jean Waline
(Bruxelles: Bruylant 2004), pp. 779–800 {& ‘Codification et recodification: Idées, tendances, modèles et
résultats contemporains’ in Studia Universitatis Babes–Bolyai Iurisprudentia, LIII (iulie–decembrie 2008) 2
[La recodification et les tendances actuelles du droit privé Balti, 9–12 octombrie 2008], 11–29 & <http://stu-
dia.law.ubbcluj.ro/articole.php?an=2008>} or as ‘Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium’
Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 2, pp. 89–117 {&
<http://www.akademiai.com/content/cv56l91505t7k36q/fulltext.pdf> and in Legal and Political Aspects of
the Contemporary World ed. Mamoru Sadakata (Nagoya: Center for Asian Legal Exchange, Graduate
School, Nagoya University 2007), pp. 189–214}.
2 Such a conclusion is facilitated by the unclarified English word usage and also by the fact that, instead of
doctrinal study, it was the attempt at an axiomatical foundation of sciences—e.g., Georg Edward Moore
Principia Ethica (Cambridge: At the University Press 1903) xxvii + 232 pp. [cf., by the author, Lectures on
the Paradigms of Legal Thinking (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1999) vii + 279 pp. [Philosophiae Iuris],
p. 120]—that became instrumental in developing the linguistic analysis of law in the Common Law world.
This very fact has anticipated English legal analysis as not being based on the actual law but on sample sen-
tences hypostatised by authors or—as the early criticism of Herbert Lyonel Adolphus Hart’s The Concept of
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1961) viii + 263 pp. [Clarendon Law Series] had shown—although the analy-
sis is presented in a sociologising manner, yet it is actually constructed without any factual coverage what-
soever. Cf., by the author, ‘The Hart-phenomenon’ Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2005) 1,
pp. 83–95. For an exemplary elaboration, see Geoffrey Samuel Epistemology and Method in Law
(Aldershot & Burlington, VT.: Dartmouth 2003) xv + 384 pp. [Applied Legal Philosophy].
3 Practically the entire oeuvre of Ronald M. Dworkin—starting from his paper on ‘The Model of Rules’
University of Chicago Law Review XXXV (1967)—serves just the explication of this.
Ambivalence in Language Use. In sum, the dilemma of “rule and/or norm” car-
ries the marks of ambivalence inherent in coupling linguistic conventionalisation
with attempts at theoretical (logifying and analytical) system-building. (As a mere-
ly practical outcome, it is to be noted that albeit Hungarian language usually refers
to legal rules, yet once they are subject to a conceptual operation in doctrine, they
are treated as legal norms1).
In the final analysis, both can be used as conceptually justified in their own place
and within their own context, respectively. For language is used instrumentally and
according to established habits, while concepts are formed as mental representa-
tions according to homogenising requirements set up by the given theoretical out-
look2.
All in all, we have thereby justified the moment of identity, ambivalence and
duality inherent in the terminological dilemma of “rule and/or norm”. Despite any
remaining conceptual uncertainty, we may find it fortunate that the scholarship that
developed in both German and Hungarian language cultures belongs to the orbit of
Civil Law, which differentiates between the mere act of signalling the fact that there
is a normative message made available and the logically processed conceptual
embodiment (objectification) of such a message.
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1 E.g., Vilmos Peschka Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1982) 266 pp. theoris-
es upon norms exclusively, after an obviously similar solution was already resorted to by László Asztalos in
his Polgári jogi alaptan A polgári jog elméletéhez [A fundamental doctrine of the theory of civil law]
(Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1987) 277 pp.
2 Also cf. Norberto Bobbio ‘Norma’ in Novissimo digesto italiano XI (Torino: Utet 1964); Alf Ross
Directives and Norms (London: Routledge & Kegal Paul 1968) ix + 188 pp. [International Library of
Philosophy and Scientific Method]; Robert Alexy ‘Rechtsregeln und Rechtsprinzipien’ in Conditions of
Validity and Cognition in Modern Legal Thought ed. Neil MacCormick, Stavrou Panou, Lombardi Lauro
Vallauri (Stuttgart: Steiner 1985), pp. 13–29 [Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 25];
Georgio Robles ‘Was ist eine Regel?’ in Vernunft und Erfahrung im Rechtsdenken der Gegenwart ed.
Torstein Eckhoff, L. Friedman & Jirky Uusitalo (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1986), pp. 325–338
[Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 10]; E. Wiederin ‘Regel, Prinzip, Norm: Zu einer Kontroverse zwischen Hans
Kelsen und Josef Esser’ in Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre Ergebnisse eines Wiener
Rechtstheoretischen Seminars 1985/86, hrsg. Stanley Paulson & Robert Walter (Wien: Manz 1986), pp.
137–166 [Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen-Instituts 11]; Jerzy Wróblewski ‘Legal Rules in the Analytical
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